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Abstract 
 
At the 2005 World Summit, an important normative shift occurred in the definition of 
sovereignty as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) gained prominence. This paper 
investigates how the European Union (EU) has promoted the R2P principle at the EU 
and the international level and to what extent the EU has channelled its support for 
R2P into concrete action in Africa. The paper shows that while the EU has remained 
an active supporter of R2P at the international level, this enthusiasm has not been 
transmitted into its own policies or championed by any EU Member State. The EU has 
at its disposal a wide range of crisis management tools, yet is still far from applying 
them through coherent action, let alone under the R2P umbrella. Africa has great 
potential in developing its own peace and security framework, but this remains a 
long-term project. In this regard, EU support remains essential through political 
dialogue, sustainable financing and concrete projects to strengthen the African 
Peace and Security Architecture. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ACP      African, Caribbean and Pacific group 
AMIB      African Union Mission in Burundi 
AMIS       African Union Mission in Sudan 
AMISOM    African Union Mission in Somalia 
APF    African  Peace  Facility 
APSA      African Peace and Security Architecture 
ASF    African  Stand-by  Force 
AU    African  Union 
AU PSC    Peace and Security Council 
CEWS    Continental  Early  Warning  System 
CFSP      Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CPX    Command  Post  Exercise 
EDF    European  Development  Fund 
EEAS    European  External  Action  Service 
ESDP / CSDP    European / Common Security and Defense Policy 
ESS    European  Security  Strategy 
EU    European  Union 
EU PSC    Political and Security Committee 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA  EU military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic 
EUSR    European  Union  Special  Representative 
ICISS      International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
JAES    Joint  Africa-EU  Strategy 
MIVAC    Mécanisme interactif de Veille et d’Anticipation des Crises 
NATO    North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation 
OAU    Organisation  of  African  Unity 
PF    Peace  Fund 
POC    Protection  of  Civilians in Armed Conflict 
POW    Panel  of  the  Wise 
PSO    Peace  Support  Operation 
R2P    Responsibility  to  Protect 
REC / RM    Regional Economic Community / Regional Mechanism 
SG/HR     Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP 
UN    United  Nations 
UNGA    United  Nations  General  Assembly 
UNSC      United Nations Security Council 
UNSCR    United Nations Security Council Resolution 




                                                
1. Introduction 
 
During his first visit to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, former US President Bill Clinton 
spoke to genocide survivors, saying that “the international community, together with 
nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy” and continued 
how “[a]ll over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day 
after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you 
were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror”.1 No one but the victims, and the 
perpetrators, can fully comprehend the scale and the pace with which such 
unconceivable horrors were unleashed. This, however, should not have been an 
excuse for failing to react. The world said ‘never again’ after the Holocaust, after 
Bosnia, and after Rwanda. Those two words have lost their meaning since. 
 
The share of responsibility that President Clinton spoke about was to appear as a 
glimpse of hope with the adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005, 
where Heads of State endorsed for the first time language stating not only that every 
state has the responsibility to protect its population, but that there is also a 
responsibility on the part of the international community to react, should any state 
fail to fulfil its obligation.2 At the World Summit, an important normative shift occurred 
when sovereignty was redefined and the Responsibility to Protect gained its true 
prominence. The R2P principle essentially builds on sovereignty as responsibility, 
reaffirming the primary role of the State to protect its populations from gross human 
rights violations, yet calls on the international community to respond to such crimes 
when the State manifestly fails to protect its own populations.3 
 
Without this formal acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect the indifference 
shown since by many governments towards the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in 
Zimbabwe and Darfur, post-election violence in Kenya, the Russian-Georgian conflict 
and the humanitarian crisis in Burma/Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis might have 
triggered less debate over the application of the R2P principle as such. As it turned 
out, these cases have raised questions over what constitutes R2P situations, 
highlighted the principle’s limitations and lack of political leverage, but at the same 
time pointed to progress made in operationalising R2P. The concept thus continues 
to advance and to consolidate its principles following the 2005 World Summit, with 
the goal to turn the political commitment into effective action for the sole purpose of 
an immediate protection of people from mass atrocities.4  
 
 
1  J. Bennet, “Clinton Declares U.S., with World, Failed Rwandans”, The New York Times, 26 
March 1998. 
2  United Nations, General Assembly Resolution, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 
New York, 24 October 2005, p. 30. 
3 Ibid. 
4 D. Steinberg, “Responsibility to Protect: Coming of Age?”, Global Responsibility to Protect, 
vol. 1, no. 4, October 2009, pp. 432-441.  
The Responsibility to Protect, as outlined by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, is composed of three elements: (a) 
the responsibility to prevent, (b) the responsibility to react, and (c) the responsibility to 
rebuild.5 While there are legal difficulties and disagreements over framing R2P as an 
emerging norm, the scope for such debate goes beyond this paper, and R2P will 
thus be referred to as either a concept or a principle with essentially political force. 
For the purpose of this paper the focus will be mainly on the responsibility to react, for 
two reasons. First, the utilisation of coercive measures, namely the use of force in 
responding to mass atrocities, is still perceived as the most controversial aspect of 
R2P. Second, the EU has the greatest potential to fully operationalise R2P, not only 
because of its standing as a ‘normative power’ and the prime model for conflict 
prevention across its own territory, but also because the EU already has a large set of 
practical instruments and policies to apply in the realm of prevention and 
rebuilding.6 However, what the EU does not yet have is a clear set of guidelines for 
reacting, including through military intervention, to gross human rights violations. 
 
Africa continues to be a continent of conflicts – marred with civil wars and intra-state 
violence – and therefore risk-prone for R2P situations. In its relations with the African 
continent in the field of peace and security, the EU has become increasingly active 
in supporting the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), providing 
sustainable funding and engaging in deeper political dialogue to strengthen the 
African Union’s own performance regarding the Responsibility to Protect. This has 
been especially relevant due to Africa’s move from the principle of non-intervention 
to non-indifference. The EU’s approach is thus in line with the 2009 United Nations 
(UN) Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of R2P.7 In the report, the 
three-pillar strategy places first the primacy of the state’s protection responsibilities, 
second the need for international assistance in capacity-building, and only third a 
timely and decisive response by the international community should the primary 
responsibility of the state fail.8  
 
This paper addresses the following questions: first, how has the EU promoted the R2P 
principle at the EU and the international level? Second, to what extent has the EU 
channelled its support for R2P into concrete action in Africa? 
 
This paper argues that the EU is one of the most fervent supporters of the 
Responsibility to Protect. However, while there have been some cases of R2P being 
integrated into EU official documentation, the apparent political support for it has 
not been translated into actions taken at the EU level, especially in terms of 
                                                 
5 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001, p. xi. 
6 G.  Evans,  The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, 
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2008, pp. 183-184. 
7 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 
A/63/677, New York, 12 January 2009, pp. 15-22. 
8 N. Grono, “Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Protect”, African Affairs, vol. 105, 
no. 421, October 2006, pp. 621-631. 
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mainstreaming R2P into the full range of relevant EU policies. The paper will also show 
that the EU has at its disposal all the instruments and enforcement mechanisms to 
make R2P a reality, but is still far from harmonising them into a single, coherent action 
capacity, or placing them under the R2P umbrella. Moreover, the APSA has great 
potential and has placed African states at the centre of resolving their own conflicts, 
but its realisation remains a long-term project. For this reason, the EU has proven to 
be a key partner in supporting the APSA development as well as in contributing to 
greater consolidation of existing structures at the continental and regional level.  
 
The second chapter considers how the EU has integrated the Responsibility to Protect 
into its own policies, explores EU support for the concept in UN forums, and presents 
the challenges involved in operationalising the EU’s responsibility to react. The Africa-
EU partnership will be the topic of the third chapter, where more recent develop-
ments on peace and security issues in Africa will be assessed – with special focus on 
the African Peace and Security Architecture – and concrete measures by the EU in 
support of capacity-building will be analyzed. 
 
 
2.  Incorporating the Responsibility to Protect into EU policies 
 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003 was the first official document 
to outline the main threats to the EU and to position the Union within the global stage 
by underlining the need for taking a “share in the responsibility for global security and 
in building a better world”.9 Yet any reference to the Responsibility to Protect was 
missing as it seems EU officials had reservations over explicitly mentioning the 
principle and an unclear understanding of what it entailed. There was also a sense 
that R2P was too constraining, and more importantly, that it was first and foremost 
the UN that had the obligation to act.10 Nevertheless, progress was secured with the 
December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS, which embedded R2P by 
clearly stating that “[s]overeign governments must take responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.11  
 
2.1  An EU Responsibility to Protect agenda: what is that? 
 
The Responsibility to Protect was already included in two other official documents 
before the ESS report. The European Consensus on Development, adopted in 2006, 
not only highlights the EU’s support for R2P in Article 37, but also underlines its 
intention to contribute towards a “strengthened role for the regional and sub-
regional organisations in the process of enhancing international peace and 
                                                 
9 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 1. 
10 Interview with Elise Ford, Head of Office, Oxfam International, Brussels, 20 April 2010. 
11 Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World, S407/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008, p. 2. 
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security”.12 Moreover, the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid recalls in 
Article 17 the commitments – regarding state responsibilities and at the international 
level – made at the World Summit.13 The European Commission has placed emphasis 
on the responsibility to prevent where it believes the EU has the greatest potential to 
operationalise R2P – albeit not calling it R2P – through existing tools, ranging from 
“structural long-term preventive instruments – such as development co-operation, 
trade, arms control [...] as well as political dialogue – to the diplomatic and 
humanitarian instruments for short-term prevention”. 14 However, in 2007, Gareth 
Evans pointed out that while the European Commission may have acknowledged 
the development of the principle, it emphasises that the decision to act lies on the 
UN Member States. According to Evans, the “Commission does not seem to see itself 
as having any particular responsibility to take the R2P concept forward”.15  
 
The European Parliament has been the most vocal amongst EU institutions on 
applying the Responsibility to Protect, adopting six resolutions in total on the situation 
in Darfur since the 2005 Summit. The first time the European Parliament made 
reference to R2P was in April 2006 when it urged the UNSC to “address the violence 
in Darfur, which is tantamount to genocide, and to act on its responsibility to protect 
civilians”.16 Subsequent references were made in the same year, but also in 2007 and 
2008 relating to the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Darfur, claiming that 
Sudan had failed its responsibility to protect and criticising its lack of cooperation 
with the International Criminal Court. The last resolution was adopted in March 2009 
as a response to Sudan’s expulsion of Non-Governmental Organisations from 
Darfur.17  
 
However, while the Parliament’s active engagement is welcomed, Elise Ford argues 
that due to a lack of understanding of the R2P concept, the European Parliament 
sometimes misapplies such reference and consequently runs the risk of undermining 
it.18 This was the case when the European Parliament referred to R2P in its resolutions 
on China’s role in Africa and on the situation in Burma/Myanmar.19 In addition, the 
Parliament is also not always united as was shown by the opposition of some 
European Parliament parties to the insertion of the R2P reference in a resolution on 
the ESS implementation.20  
                                                 
12 European  Union,  The European Consensus on Development, 2006/C 46/01, Brussels, 24 
February 2006, p. 7. 
13  Council of the European Union, The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, 2008/C 
25/01, Brussels, 30 January 2008, p. 2. 
14  M. Vincent & J. Wouters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Where Does the EU Stand?”, 
Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation & Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
Policy Brief, Brussels, July 2008, p. 6. 
15   G. Evans, “The Unfinished Responsibility to Protect Agenda: Europe’s Role”, 
EPC/IPPR/Oxfam Policy Dialogue, 5 July 2007. 
16  European  Parliament,  European Parliament Resolution on Darfur, P6_TA(2006)0142, 
Strasbourg, 6 April 2006. 
17 International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect, “Crisis in Darfur”, 2010. 
18 Interview with Elise Ford, op.cit. 
19 Vincent & Wouters, op.cit., p. 5. 
20 Ibid. 
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While generally supportive of the Responsibility to Protect, EU Member States have 
yet to incorporate this concept into their national legislation. France has codified R2P 
in the White Paper on Defence and National Security and the White Paper of the 
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, both adopted in 2008. The United Kingdom 
has confirmed its support for R2P in the 2008 National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom. Norway is the only other European country to have done the same in the 
Norwegian White Paper No. 15.21 Considering the active support for R2P by EU 
Member States at the international level, this lack of follow-up at the national level is 
disappointing. Two potential factors affecting progress within individual states should 
be considered. First, Member States may be applying R2P principles, but without 
actually calling it R2P. The concept has not been at the heart of the debate within 
the EU which reduces any pressure on Member States to integrate R2P individually.22 
Second, the key to wider acceptance would be a better understanding of ‘R2P 
situations’, where a balance needs to be struck between perceptions that military 
action is the sole option and the value of addressing wider-ranging issues. 23  
Therefore, apart from France, which insists on its own interpretation of R2P, there is no 
single EU champion that would push the concept within EU circles.24    
2.2  R2P versus human security 
There has been significant debate on whether the EU has been pursuing a human 
security agenda and how that affects the EU’s own perception of applying R2P in its 
policies. Human security, as defined by the so-called Barcelona Report led by Mary 
Kaldor, is the “individual freedom from basic insecurities” ranging from “genocide, 
wide-spread or systematic torture [and] inhuman and degrading treatment” to 
“[m]assive violations of the right to food, health and housing”.25 Louise Arbour, the 
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, believes that R2P opens a new era in 
pursuing human security. However, she wonders whether its application is too 
narrow, giving priority to civil and political rights over economic, social and cultural 
rights, which encompass issues such as the food crisis, global epidemics and climate 
change.26 However, the principal authority on R2P, Gareth Evans, argues strongly 
that R2P is not “about conflict more generally [...] or human security more generally: 
it’s not about solving all the world’s problems, just one small sub-set of them” and 
that it is ultimately about the way we react “when we are confronted with the horror 
of another Cambodia, another Rwanda, another Bosnia”.27  
                                                 
21 International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect, “Responsibility to Protect and 
Europe”, 2010. 
22 Interview with Elise Ford, op.cit. 
23 Evans, “The Unfinished Responsibility to Protect Agenda: Europe’s Role”, op.cit. 
24  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  D a m i e n  H e l l y ,  R e s e a r c h  F e l l o w ,  E U  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S e c u r i t y  S t u d i e s ,  p h o n e  
interview, 22 March 2010. 
25  “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on 
Europe’s Security Capabilities”, 15 September 2004, p. 9. 
26 L. Arbour,  Integrating Security, Development and Human Rights, San Diego, Joan B. Kroc 
Institute for Peace & Justice, 2008, pp. 49-52. 
27 G. Evans, President Emeritus, International Crisis Group, “Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect”, statement, United Nations General Assembly Interactive Dialogue on the 
Responsibility to Protect, New York, 23 July 2009, p. 1. 
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The recent report by the UNSG on human security provides the best clarification on 
how the two concepts relate to one another when it states that the “use of force is 
not envisaged in the application of the human security concept”.28 Within the EU, 
many officials have argued that the human security concept has been de facto 
accepted in the fields of development cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis 
management. Still, John Kotsopoulos defends an EU human security agenda as a 
way to strengthen its moral standing at the global stage by serving “the pragmatic 
purpose of enhancing the EU’s soft power”.29 This brings to the table the question of 
the ultimate purpose of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
ambiguity over the EU’s ‘grand strategy’ between being good – where its mere 
existence based on certain values30 contributes to stability and security – and doing 
good through interventions. Looking at the range of Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) missions, Bailes argues that “the pattern of missions has been driven by 
self-centred motives [...] as much as by the calculus of humanitarian impact”.31 What 
i s  c l e a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  b y  c h o o s i n g  l o w - r i s k  o p e r a t i o n s  w i t h  l i t t l e  f o r c e  
involved, the EU undermines – if not ignores –  “some of the literal and metaphorical 
cries for help that ought to mean most for a European sense of values”.32 
2.3  Promotion at the international level: the EU-UN partnership 
At the international level, the United Nations have been the primary forum for EU 
support for the Responsibility to Protect. Before the World Summit took place in 
September 2005, the June meeting of the European Council backed the R2P 
concept and underlined that it should be implemented by the UN Security Council.33 
Soon after the Summit, the General Affairs and External Relations Council welcomed 
in its conclusions the endorsement of R2P and marked it as “an important tool of the 
international community for addressing the worst atrocities”.34 This has also been 
reflected in the EU priorities for each forthcoming session of the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), including for the 64th UNGA where paragraph 8 states the 
EU’s commitment to the R2P concept as well as that “the EU is determined to make 
the concept operational”.35 Moreover, within the first two years after the adoption of 
                                                 
28 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Human Security, A/64/701, New York, 8 
March 2010, pp. 6-7.  
29 J. Kotsopoulos, “A Human Security Agenda for the EU: Would it Make a Difference?”, Studia 
Diplomatica, vol. 60, no. 1, 2007, pp. 213, 226. 
30 These values include the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
respect for human rights and the rule of law. European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 13 
December 2007”, Official Journal of the European Union, C115, 9 May 2008, art. 2. 
31 A.J.K. Bailes, “The EU and a ‘better world’: what role for the European Security and Defence 
Policy?”, International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, January 2008, pp. 119-123. 
32 Ibid., p. 120. 
33 Council of the European Union, European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10255/1/05 REV 
1, Brussels, 15 July 2005. 
34 Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations Council Presidency 
Conclusions, 2687th meeting, 13737/1/05 REV 1, Brussels, 7 November 2005. 
35 Council of the European Union, EU Priorities for the 64th United Nations General Assembly, 
10809/09, Brussels, 9 June 2009. 
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the Outcome Document, over 50 references to R2P were made by EU Member 
States in either the UN Security Council or the General Assembly.36  
 
In operationalising the concept, the EU has forged a strong relationship with the UN, 
namely through several declarations that have institutionalised this natural 
partnership. The key initiatives were the 2004 and 2007 Joint Statements on UN-EU 
Cooperation in Crisis Management, striving for closer coordination and establishing 
at the working level joint consultative mechanisms, as well as the 2004 document on 
EU-UN cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations.37 The latter focuses 
especially on rapid response operations, outlining the ‘bridging model’ and the 
‘stand-by model’ as two options for how the EU could militarily support the UN.38    
 
Paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document clearly underlines the primacy of the 
UNSC when deciding on collective action in accordance with the UN Charter, 
especially Chapter VII.39 However, including R2P into the deliberations of the Council 
has proven to be an extremely difficult and sensitive task. The first instance was in 
fact the semi-annual debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (POC), 
leading to UNSC Resolution 1674 (2006), where the Council made its first official R2P 
reference by reaffirming the adoption of Paragraphs 138 and 139 at the World 
Summit (see Annex I). The adoption of this resolution has therefore further codified 
the R2P principle within the UN system.40 This can be in large part attributed to the 
extensive advocacy of several EU Member States with France applauding “the 
perseverance of the United Kingdom in presenting and bringing this project to 
fruition”.41 Built on the same normative framework and legal obligations of protecting 
individuals, POC debates have enjoyed EU support as a way to keep the R2P on the 
Security Council agenda.42  
2.4  Operationalising the EU’s responsibility to react 
The added value of the European Union in operationalising its responsibility to react is 
the wide range of instruments and actions at its disposal. According to Glume and 
Martens, this includes CSDP civilian and military missions, the use of economic, 
                                                 
36 Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society, “Excerpts of Government Statements on the 
Responsibility to Protect, Europe, 2005-2007”, op.cit. 
37 C. Major, “EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD 
Congo in 2006”, EU Institute for Security Studies: Occasional Paper, no. 72, Paris, September 
2008, pp. 10-12. 
38 The ‘bridging model’ would give the UN the time to redeploy or mount a new mission, while 
the ‘stand-by model’ would provide an EU reserve force, including for extraction purposes. 
Ibid. 
39  United Nations, General Assembly Resolution, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 
New York, 24 October 2005, p. 30. 
40 International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect, “Protection of Civilians: Security 
Council Open Debates Reference RtoP”, 2010.  
41 United Nations, Security Council, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 5476th meeting, 
S/PV.5476, New York, 28 June 2006, p. 20. 
42 “The Relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict”, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, January 2009. 
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financial and targeted sanctions, arms embargoes, and the appointment of special 
representatives.43  
 
The use of sanctions by the EU is regarded as “part of peace-making initiatives in 
conflict and attempts to protect civilians from government repression” and signals 
“EU punishment for or approval of certain policies”.44 The EU Council’s Basic Principles 
on the Use of Restrictive Measures underlines its commitment to use “sanctions as 
part of an integrated, comprehensive policy approach which [...] could even 
involve, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures in accordance with the UN 
Charter”.45 However, Mepham and Ramsbotham outline two crucial elements for 
consideration: first is the need for redesigning sanctions that cause more harm to the 
general population than to the perpetrators into more discriminating, ‘smart’ 
sanctions; and second is the question of timing. As an example, they argue that 
“sanctions would have been no use to civilians following the outbreak of mass killing 
in Rwanda in 1994”.46  
 
While the role of relevant EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) will be further 
elaborated in the subsequent chapter, it is necessary to emphasise that their 
geographical spread and in-depth knowledge of situations on the ground, 
complemented by the work of personal representatives and advisers on numerous 
thematic issues, makes them an extremely useful tool for early warning action and 
mediation when crises erupt.47   
 
Since the launch of the CSDP, the EU has already completed 14 operations and had 
in place 14 active missions at the time of writing, four of which are in Africa (EU 
NAVFOR Somalia, EUTM Somalia, EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo). Ranging 
from police training and monitoring missions to Rule of Law and military operations, 
the EU has shown the ability to take on a wide-range of crisis management tasks.48 
However, there is a difference between EU CSDP missions providing peacekeeping 
support – as with EUFOR RD Congo or the EU Support to AMIS II mission in Darfur49 – 
and the direct deployment of a military force in cases of an imminent or ongoing 
gross human rights violation. Holt and Berkman make this distinction by underlining 
that “a military intervention designed to protect civilians from mass killing is 
fundamentally different from a peace operation mandated to protect civilians from 
                                                 
43 G. Glume & Q. Martens, “La Responsabilité de protéger: où en est l’Union européenne?”, 
Les Cahiers du RMES, vol. 6, no. 1, 2009, p. 116.  
44 J. Kreutz, “Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union”, Bonn 
International Centre for Conversion, Bonn, 2005, p. 42. 
45  Council of the European Union, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures 
(Sanctions), 10198/1/04 REV 1, Brussels, 7 June 2004, p. 2. 
46 D. Mepham & A. Ramsbotham, “Safeguarding Civilians: Delivering on the Responsibility to 
Protect in Africa”, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 2007, p. 20. 
47 “Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: European Perspectives”, Responsibility to Protect 
Engaging Civil Society, 25 June 2008. 
48  “Chart of EU Missions”, International Security Information Service, Europe, November-
December 2010. 
49 W. Assanvo & C.E.B. Pout, “The European Union: African Peace and Security Environment’s 
Champion?”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris, November 2007, pp. 19-20, 22. 
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much lesser risks”. 50 In short, the immediate protection requires what has been 
described as ‘coercive protection missions’, when the demand arises for “a rapid 
and forceful ‘fire brigade’ response”.51 This brings up difficult questions of whether 
the EU is focusing more on dealing with broader issues within the human security 
realm, and whether a specific ‘R2P doctrine’ is required to provide clear guidelines 
for EU military action if or when R2P is invoked. 
                                                
 
The EU military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA) was the closest the EU got to the Responsibility to Protect,52 and one of 
the main objectives outlined in its mandate was the protection of civilians. The 
mission demonstrated that “once again the EU could successfully project several 
thousand troops away from Europe without NATO, to carry out Petersberg tasks, 
including combat if need be, in coordination with the United Nations”.53 Neverthe-
less, while the mission may have included R2P principles, its raison d’être was 
discussed before the mission and it took six months for an agreement and for 
deployment to start.54 Alyson Bailes points out correctly that “the EU has not yet 
contemplated a mission of the most strongly humanitarian sort that recognizes an 
international ‘responsibility to protect’”.55  
 
In order to provide added value in “the continuum of prevention-reaction-
rebuilding”, Damien Helly argues that the EU should “adopt an R2P doctrine defining 
guidelines for action and reaction”.56 Building on already existing documents, such 
as the ESS and the Göteborg Programme on conflict prevention, the EU could also 
incorporate elements from the ICISS report – including the precautionary principles – 
and determine the scope of the reaction agenda, the types of abuses that would 
need such a response, and clear up what the protection of civilians means.57 Holt 
and Berkman point out that the EU could instead use the military doctrine of the lead 
nation in CSDP operations. The UK doctrine, for example, has the potential to do so 
as it reflects the closest language of R2P, but stops short in considering Peace 
Support Operations (PSOs) solely for the protection of civilians.58 Helly believes that 
the EU should have a political debate on finding a common approach and clarifying 
under which conditions it would be prepared to use force. The Lisbon Treaty offers a 
 
50 V.K. Holt & T.C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility 
to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, Washington, D.C., Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006, 
p. 3. 
51 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, op.cit., 
p. 214. 
52 Interview with an official, Permanent Representation of France to the EU, Brussels, 25 March 
2010. 
53 G. Grevi, D. Helly & D. Keohane (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 
Years (1999-2009), Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 348. 
54 Interview with Elise Ford, op.cit. 
55 Bailes, op.cit., p. 124. 
56 D. Helly, “Africa, the EU and R2P: Towards Pragmatic International Subsidiarity?”, Journal for 
International Relations and Global Trends, issue 1, January 2009, p. 55. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Holt & Berkman, op.cit., pp. 114-119, 130. 
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good opportunity to hold such a debate and set clearer priorities, especially within 
the formation of the European External Action Service (EEAS).59  
 
However, EU Member States remain divided as there seem to be those who oppose 
peace enforcement missions, those that believe a clear mandate is more important 
to consider than the risks, and those placing urgency and justice before legality.60 It is 
very difficult to operationalise the EU’s responsibility to react as setting guidelines for 
intervention also means a show of commitment to deploy troops, and Member 
States are reluctant to pre-engage themselves in such a way. Instead, priority is given 
in agreed policies to supporting UN and African capabilities,61 which could also 
explain the lack of pressure to include R2P at the EU level. 
 
The EU Battle Groups are at the moment “the primary operational tool for EU military 
interventions [...] capable of robust peace enforcement on a limited scale” and are 
“designed to be compatible with UN Chapter VII mandates”.62 Operational since 
January 2007, the EU maintains at any given time two concurrent 1,500-strong Battle 
Groups for rapid response on a rotational basis of six months, and are deployable 
within ten days and can be sustained up to four months.63 As long as Africa lacks 
enough autonomous capabilities for intervention – either on its own or in support of 
UN operations – the EU must maintain the Battle Group option for direct deployment 
in Africa or elsewhere. This could be essential in cases where it is hard to find 
sufficiently neutral African states, or where the African Union would be reluctant or 
unable to act.64  
 
In the meantime, the EU could develop specific guidelines to operationalise civilian 
protection mandates.65 The EULEX Kosovo mission is so far the only mission where the 
Joint Action incorporates preventive elements – especially important for theatres of 
operation that are risk-prone to mass atrocities – and includes explicit mention of R2P 
by referring to UNSCR 1674 (2006).66 However, Helly warns against a systematic 
incorporation of the R2P concept into CSDP mandates: the EU should aim instead for 
well-targeted and tailored mandates depending on the situation. Political aspirations 
need to be balanced with actual capabilities for the protection of civilians in order 
to avoid situations where EU forces would prove unable to fulfil their mandate.67 
Building on best practice, Ford argues that civilian protection mandates would give 
the possibility to outline action at the EU level and include R2P elements into EU rules 
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of engagement. The mandate of EUFOR Tchad/RCA included a number of well-
thought out ad hoc guidelines, including a clear prioritisation of its objectives and 
strict policy of neutrality. While this was not passed onto the existing UN mission, EU 
Member States currently holding UNSC seats are working on improving such 
guidelines at the UN level.68 
 
The EU is clear on promoting and strengthening the development of capabilities and 
structures on the African continent through a joint partnership – the topic of the next 
chapter. Even though strong EU support is welcomed by African states, one must also 
wonder whether this strategy is intended, in part, to delegate some of the EU’s 
responsibility to react to the African Union. 
 
3.  The EU and Africa: building a strategic partnership 
 
Africa entered the new millennium revitalised with the establishment in 2002 of the 
African Union – replacing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – which built 
directly on the ideas of pan-Africanism through regional integration. Initiated by 
South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki and the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the 
AU was to become “the frame for a new African regionalism” resting on the 
“recognition of the need to redefine the parameters of political, socio-economic 
and security developments on the African continent”.69  
 
Already in the 1960s, a united Africa was promoted as the only viable option to 
address the wide range of problems facing the continent. While the origins of pan-
Africanism lie outside the scope of this paper, it is necessary to acknowledge its 
importance both as an instrument and an ideology during the decolonisation 
process. The idea was at the time spearheaded by Ghana’s President Kwame 
Nkrumah and his contributions became instrumental in the creation of the OAU, 
symbolising pan-African unity.70 However, divisions between African leaders over the 
role of the organisation rendered it ineffective since the day of its inception, and the 
principle of non-intervention provided a carte blanche for the members in dealing 
with their internal matters.71  
3.1  African solutions to African problems: the birth of the African Union 
Considering that for the duration of the OAU’s existence roughly 30 conflicts claiming 
around ten million lives can be recorded – in large part due to the fault of the 
organisation’s own incapacity and unwillingness to respond – the Constitutive Act of 
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  15  
the AU signifies a crucial shift by African states in the conceptualisation of 
sovereignty. Member States have expressed respect for territorial integrity only when 
sovereignty is exercised responsibly and designated the AU “as the ultimate 
guarantor and protector of the rights and well-being of the African people”.72 The 
endorsement by the AU of the Responsibility to Protect principle took place both at 
the continental as well as the international level. At the first level is the wording of 
Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, specifically paragraph (h) which gives the AU “the 
right [...] to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity”.73 Clearly, Article 4(h) endorsed R2P even before the ICISS report was 
released a year later. Along with other documents such as the Protocol Relating to 
the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the AU has 
spelled out a set of principles, resting on the ideas of R2P.74 
 
At the international level, the AU’s Executive Council met in March 2005, ahead of 
the World Summit, to form a common position on UN reform – known as the Ezulwini 
consensus – and contributed significantly to ending the notion of R2P as a purely 
Western ideal by signalling direct support from the developing countries.75 However, 
while the consensus backed the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change criteria, it also underlined the importance of preventing the abuse of R2P to 
undermine states’ sovereignty as well as the need for compliance with Article 51 of 
the UN Charter and Article 4 of the Constitutive Act. This is directly linked with the 
AU’s wish to maintain its own primary responsibility by insisting that when deciding on 
intervention, regional deliberations should take precedence over international 
ones.76 Thus, due to the proximity and nature of conflicts, it is the AU that bears the 
responsibility for intervening in “the ‘Try Africa First’ approach to peace, security and 
conflict management”.77  
3.2  Making the African Peace and Security Architecture a reality 
The African Peace and Security Architecture is considered a major breakthrough in 
efforts to build-up the AU’s capacity to effectively respond to peace and security 
issues, encompassing a set of norms, structures and procedures at the continental 
and sub-regional level.78  
 
The APSA is comprised of five main components (see Annex II), notably the Peace 
and Security Council (AU PSC) as a 15-member political decision-making body, the 
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African Stand-by Force (ASF), a mediating and advisory body named the Panel of 
the Wise (POW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Peace 
Fund. 79 The ASF undoubtedly stands out as the most prominent and ambitious 
dimension of the APSA and builds on earlier ideas of a continental rapid reaction 
force as part of the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution in 1993. However, the key change was to incorporate 
the regional mechanisms as ‘building-blocks’ and provide for a strong connection – 
through harmonisation and cooperation – between the AU80 on the one hand, and 
three Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and two Regional Mechanism (RMs) 
on the other hand.81 
                                                
 
The AU PSC was perceived as a necessary step toward creating an operational 
structure in implementing AU decisions in the conflict prevention, resolution and 
reconstruction realm. It is for this reason that its mandate includes the anticipation 
and prevention of conflicts, the authorisation of PSOs, the implementation of peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the development of a common 
defence policy and coordination of efforts at the continental level. The AU PSC is 
therefore placed at the heart of the APSA, and is directly supported by the AU 
Commission as well as the remaining four components mentioned above.  
 
The ASF is a clear demonstration that as the legal and political debate over the 
Responsibility to Protect continues, progress can still be made on the capability to 
protect. For the AU, the ASF will provide not only “the option to act in cases when 
there is international consensus to do so” but would also place pressure on states 
and groups involved “to desist from atrocities and allow [...] humanitarian 
intervention or else face forcible action”.82 The ASF reflects determination to address 
the major difficulties encountered during the deployment of AU missions since 2003 – 
including the AU Missions in Burundi and Sudan, AMIB and AMIS, respectively – as well 
as their high financial and logistical dependence on non-African states. This is still 
evident in the ongoing AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).83 The end-goal is to have in 
place five regional multidisciplinary brigades of roughly 4,000 soldiers, up to 500 
military observers as well as civilian and police components. The aim, therefore, is to 
 
79 A. Vines & R. Middleton, “Options for the EU to Support the African Peace and Security 
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Paper, Ottawa, May 2005, pp. 14-16. 
81 The five regions are as follows: the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
in Central Africa; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the South, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West; the Eastern Africa 
Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) in the East; and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) in 
the North. K. Vervaeke, “EU-AU Cooperation in Military Crisis Management and Capacity-
Building: A View from Practice”, Studia Diplomatica, vol. 62, no. 3, 2009, p. 76. 
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strengthen and assemble capabilities from the five corresponding regions and to 
keep suitable forces on stand-by in their respective countries.84  
 
It is important to underline that the majority of Africa’s sub-regional organisations 
have already created certain capacities and mechanisms as they have been in 
place longer than the AU. Therefore, it is crucial that institutional capacity-building is 
focused at the continental level, and direct support is given to the five brigades 
reaching operational capability.85  
 
Progress on the ASF, however, has not met its targets and more importantly, has 
been uneven between the different regions. It is widely accepted that the role of the 
RECs/RMs is essential to an effective peace and security architecture, yet the AU-
designated five regions simply do not equate with the existing sub-regional 
organisations.86 There is therefore a need for a rationalisation of the regions, as 
promoted by the AU Commission, but has so far proven to be a difficult task, with 
each grouping claiming its raison d’être. The Memorandum of Understanding 
between the AU and the RECs/RMs provides for a degree of harmonisation and 
prevents duplication, but much depends on individual AU Member States.87  
 
The ASF regions should be the starting point for regional integration, with the need for 
the political and economic groupings to mould around them.88 However, not only is 
there limited REC/RM representation at the AU, but sub-regional organisations are 
much more focused on dealing with development and governance issues than their 
counterparts in Addis Ababa who are concerned more with peace and security 
issues at the continental level. This problem is coupled with a general decline of 
political will since the AU’s establishment as well as, at the national level, the 
continuing capacity gap to contribute to PSOs.89 
3.3  The EU’s role in strengthening Africa’s Responsibility to Protect 
On the EU side, several developments have led to a renewed interest in engaging 
Africa in peace and security matters, including the creation of the AU and the 
emergence of its principle of non-indifference, the proposal for a continental 
approach to peace and security through the APSA, and the AU’s clear demonstra-
tion of readiness to take over responsibility in peacekeeping operations.90 The EU 
Strategy for Africa adopted by the European Council in late 2005 was designed to 
frame the EU’s cooperation with the African continent as a whole, explicitly stating 
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that “Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic 
Africa”.91 The strategy not only acknowledged the interconnectedness between 
peace and security and development, but also identified “African partnership as a 
sine qua non for a constructive relationship”.92 While criticised for not including 
African partners, the strategy introduced a more political, rather than just 
developmental, focus on relations with Africa.93  
 
In 2000, the first EU-Africa Summit took place in Cairo, representing a new 
momentum for the special relationship between the two continents. 94 Even though 
seven years passed before a second EU-Africa Summit took place in Lisbon, the 
current partnership rests firmly on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES),  95 which was 
adopted in 2007 and formulated a joint approach based on African ownership and 
principles of partnership. The Partnership on Peace and Security was determined as 
one of four distinct objectives within this strategic framework. For that particular 
objective, the JAES Action Plan sets out three priority areas, namely (a) enhanced 
dialogue on peace and security challenges, (b) the full operationalisation of APSA, 
and (c) sustainable funding for Africa’s PSOs.96  
 
Enhanced dialogue is taking place at several levels, where especially the 
Commission-to-Commission meetings are considered to be a major achievement, 
and is perceived as the way forward to a better understanding of Africa’s 
challenges and also towards aligned positions in international fora. 97  Close 
consultation with the African partners has become standard practice before the EU 
makes decisions in Brussels. There are of course disagreements over certain issues, 
but the AU is learning to formulate strong and unified positions that sometimes make 
it harder for the EU – as a partner – to disagree.98 Africa-EU Summits are now held 
every three years – with the most recent summit taking place in November 2010 – 
and meetings are multiplying at the ministerial, parliamentarian and expert levels. 
Also important are the joint meetings between the EU Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) and the AU PSC, which have been occurring since November 
2008.  
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Another important development was the appointment in 2007 of Koen Vervaeke as 
the EU Special Representative to the AU – double-hatted as the Head of EU 
Delegation based in Addis Ababa.99 However, according to EUSR Vervaeke, R2P is 
not as such on the agenda when discussing peace and security matters with the 
African Union. Instead, ad hoc implementation of the AU’s non-indifference principle 
is undertaken and supported. Closer cooperation on R2P-related issues should be 
established, and the Lisbon Treaty does provide opportunities to optimise the EU’s 
instruments and policies by forging greater coherence.100 At present there is an 
unclear division of labour between EUSR Vervaeke and General Pierre-Michel Joana, 
who was appointed in 2008 as Special Adviser for African Peacekeeping 
Capabilities. The latter is tasked with coordinating all activities with African partners 
relating to the peace and security architecture within the Council of the EU as well 
as the European Commission.101   
 
The establishment of the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004 represents the most 
direct EU support for Africa’s capacity-building, and is according to EUSR Vervaeke 
providing “for the first time a reliable, predictable and sustainable funding source for 
[AU-led] operations”.102 The APF is guided by the JAES Action Plan for resource 
allocation, where the bulk of the finances, € 600 million, go towards PSOs such as 
AMIS and AMISOM, but also AU missions in the Central African Republic and the 
Comoros. Capacity-building – that is the operationalisation of APSA and 
strengthening of political dialogue – receives € 100 million, while € 15 million has been 
allocated for Early Response Mechanisms. 103  The APF has been seen as very 
controversial in the development community as part of an overall trend to the 
militarisation of aid,104 but EUSR Vervaeke argues that the APF – in linking security with 
development – has made some of the best use of development resources in 
supporting the ‘software’ of the APSA. When resources are combined from all the 
relevant financial instruments, the AU will receive an impressive one billion Euros to 
develop its peace and security architecture.105  
 
Three factors, however, complicate the effective functioning of this tool. First, the APF 
is currently funded by the 10th European Development Fund (EDF), which places 
considerable limitations on the use of resources, specifically the prohibition of 
covering military and arms expenses such as military training and equipment. 
Second, separate funding instruments are utilised by individual Member States.106 
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Last, there is an overlap between the APF and various geographically applicable 
financial mechanisms, including the Development Cooperation Instrument, the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and the Instrument for Stability.  
 
Another essential EU contribution towards the self-sustainability of the ASF is through 
its training programme – the AMANI AFRICA – which constitutes the Europeanisation 
o f  a  t e n - y e a r  F r e n c h  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  W e s t  A f r i c a .  F i n a n c e d  b y  t h e  A P F ,  i t s  g o a l  i s  t o  
provide strategic-level training, both military and civilian, to help build an operational 
ASF.107 B u i l d i n g  o n  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  F r e n c h  E U R O  R E C A M P  t r a i n i n g  c y c l e ,  t h i s  C S D P  
instrument aims to harmonise continental and sub-regional decision-making 
processes with the AU and ASF procedures and doctrines.108 EUSR Vervaeke has 
doubts whether the ASF concept might run up against the same problems the EU is 
faced with when discussing the use of the Battle Groups. Still, testing the ASF 
capabilities to respond to a crisis through the Command Post Exercise (CPX) will take 
stock of the level of implementation and shed light on how the ASF would be 
mobilised and under what kind of political leadership.109 Worth mentioning is also a 
separate, yet complementary, joint venture run since 2009 between the UK, France, 
the AU and the EU to combine early warning systems under the Mécanisme interactif 
de Veille et d’Anticipation des Crises (MIVAC) aiming, inter alia, to fully equip the 
AU’s situation room.110 
 
Much more work is needed in the coming years to fully operationalise the APSA, and 
more importantly to strengthen links between the AU and the RECs/RMs. At the 
continental level, Benedikt Franke argues that “the AU’s lack of institutional capacity 
remains the most serious impediment to the effective operationalization of continent-
wide projects”, while at the regional level, the “lack of inter-operable military 
equipment” and “an overemphasis on the provision of peacekeeping training” 
continue to hamper real progress towards the ASF brigades.111  
 
EUSR Vervaeke points to the fact that with the APSA, the AU has been placed at the 
heart of peace and security matters and has consequently been forced to discuss 
these issues together with the RECs/RMs. The EU is providing financial support to 
strengthen liaison offices of the sub-regional organisations in Addis Ababa and AU 
representations to the RECs/RMs.112 Yet a complication arises with the fact that the 
EU also deals with the RECs separately – as in the case of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements – and without consulting the AU Commission first.113 What is more, in the 
continental-regional nexus, the added value of the AU must be made clear to the 
RECs/RMs, and a legal framework regulating their relations via the ASF and a 
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differentiated approach to developing the five regional brigades may offer the best 
hope for progress on this. 
 
As far as the EU is concerned, the development problems in its own CFSP / CSDP and 
uneven interests among EU Member States prevent a uniform and coherent 
approach to Africa.114 This is further complicated by the persistence of national 
priorities – namely those of the UK and France – in Africa as well as the long-standing 
role of the European Commission within the African, Caribbean and Pacific group 
(ACP) framework. Peace and security issues urgently need to be properly addressed, 
but some raise concerns that this will “undermine other areas of cooperation such as 
development, governance, trade and health”.115 While the EU is considered as the 
most important partner, there has been critique expressed from the African side that 
the EU is too focused solely on peace and security issues.116 The Africa-EU strategic 
partnership must also be considered within the wider picture where a myriad of 
actors – including the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Arab 
League and the G8 – have engaged with and contributed to the development of 
the APSA.117 
 
The UN plays a central role in Africa, which only emphasises the need for close 
cooperation with the EU and the AU. Their interdependence and pursuit of 
comparative advantages – if approached correctly – can have a crucial impact on 
Africa’s peace and security. 118  The UN will maintain its prime responsibility for 
peacekeeping on the African continent – especially so long as the APSA remains far 
from fully operational – and it is therefore important to strengthen the UN-AU-EU 
relationship. A further example is the cooperation between the EU and the US, with 
the latter supporting, inter alia, AMISOM by providing military hardware, including 
ammunition, to its troops. 
 
Ultimately, conflicts will need African solutions, but while the EU cannot impose such 
solutions, the continuing development of the APSA should not come at the cost of 
the EU’s disengagement from the continent.119 The African Union does have the 
potential to transform the idea of ‘Try Africa First’ into standard practice. The 
conceptual change made by African states in taking up their own responsibilities is 
being matched with an institutional framework and enforcement mechanisms, but 
this will take time.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
Adopting the Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 World Summit marked a milestone 
in the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty and has had significant implications for the 
conduct of world affairs ever since. While there may have been concerns over a 
potential setback to the R2P principle before the UNGA plenary debate in 2009, UN 
Member States have clearly shown continuing support for R2P and its applicability to 
cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The 
UNSG’s three-pillar strategy, which builds directly on Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
Outcome Document, has also been recognised as the right way forward in 
operationalising R2P. As the primary responsibility for protection lies with the state 
itself, the crucial role of the international community’s assistance to help develop the 
right national capabilities needs to be maintained. 
 
This paper has shown that the EU has remained an active promoter of R2P at the 
international stage since the World Summit, but has failed to reflect this political 
support in the development of its own policies. Each individual EU Member State 
endorsed and accepted the R2P principle in 2005, yet only a few have incorporated 
the concept into national documents. Such a record is discouraging to say the least. 
Over-enthusiastic initiatives taken by the European Parliament, which are not met 
with concrete results on the ground, and the cautious approach by the European 
Commission, are still far from ensuring a consistent inclusion of R2P into EU policies. 
Moreover, the de facto acceptance of the human security doctrine should also not 
serve as an alternative to R2P. 
 
With the JAES – notably the Partnership on Peace and Security – the EU has 
successfully established a framework through which it can channel its support for R2P 
into effective action on the African continent. The EU’s role in the development of 
African capabilities on peace and security matters is increasingly changing from 
paternalism to that of partnership. The signing of the JAES and the appointment of 
the EUSR to the AU sent a strong political message of ensured EU support as Africa 
takes on its responsibility to tackle ongoing conflicts. As political dialogue is 
becoming institutionalised, both sides should find an appropriate forum to include 
discussions on R2P, which could further strengthen the legitimacy of the R2P principle 
in the South. The complementary utilisation of the RECs/RMs’ structures is crucial in 
creating strong preventive and enforcement AU mechanisms. Thereby, the EU is 
contributing greatly towards better harmonising existing structures between the 
continental and the regional level. 
 
The creation of the APF marks an important sustainable financial contribution to AU-
led PSOs and to strengthening the APSA components. The EDF funding restrictions 
could be overcome by optimising funding through EU Member States’ individual 
programmes, especially in financing APSA’s ‘hardware’ designated to boost ASF 
capacities. The Lisbon Treaty provides an opportunity to streamline resource 
allocation, but Member States must avoid duplication by setting similar allocation 
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targets as the APF. EU funding for the AU PSC and the POW, as well as technical 
support to the CEWS through the MIVAC initiative are also important contributions 
towards operationalising Africa’s R2P.  
 
Furthermore, the near completion of the AMANI AFRICA cycle highlights that a fully 
operational ASF remains a long-term project, where the EU needs to maintain its 
status as key partner. Therefore, EU engagement through CFSP/CSDP instruments in 
Africa is essential for continuing its support on the ground. The EU has at its disposal a 
wide variety of civil-military operational tools that can provide direct support to AU 
and UN peacekeeping efforts, ranging from prevention, as was done with EUFOR RD 
Congo, to rebuilding as is the case with the ongoing EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo 
missions. However, the majority of CSDP missions – symbolic small force operations 
with low risks entailed – have fallen short of the concrete action needed to support 
effective conflict resolution in Africa. The work of EUSRs and the use of targeted 
sanctions are mutually supporting measures and could prove essential components 
in the EU’s operationalisation of R2P, under Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter. 
The EEAS has the potential to combine all the crisis management instruments under a 
single body and further research should be conducted on how to best integrate R2P 
principles into the new service.   
 
The EU should adopt a set of clear benchmarks to respond to R2P situations – when 
the host state fails to do so – and should outline the type of coercive protection 
missions it is prepared to undertake, mandated by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. An official strategy outlining EU action in cases of gross human rights 
violations, and when the state’s primary responsibility has failed, would reaffirm the 
EU’s commitment to values that it so vigorously defends, and would enable Europe 
to take the lead in transforming political rhetoric on R2P into guidelines for concrete 
action. Enshrining R2P at the EU level would strengthen the Union’s moral standing in 
talks with African partners and provide greater leverage for including R2P within the 
APSA components, in effect operationalising Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 
the AU. 
 
The focus of this paper has been predominantly on the responsibility to react, and 
until the APSA is fully operational and ready to respond to mass atrocities, the EU 
must maintain the option of using Battle Groups as the optimal tool to ensure an 
immediate protection of civilians. While the jus ad bellum (‘law on war’) decision 
regarding action on R2P will remain the most controversial and rests primarily on the 
UNSC, the EU could focus on contributing to the jus in bello (‘law in war’) by 
operationalising civilian protection mandates. Lessons learnt from EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
and EULEX Kosovo could be a starting point for tailored mandates matching the 
capabilities delivered. When determining the rules of engagement, national 
doctrines could provide the foundation, but balanced moral burden-sharing would 
be ensured only through an EU R2P doctrine.   
 
As a final point, this paper has argued that while continuing EU support for R2P at the 
international level is welcomed and much needed, it has undermined any sense of 
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urgency on incorporating the R2P principle into EU policies. Furthermore, while EU 
support for African capacity-building is on the right track – and the JAES 
implementation will only strengthen Africa-EU relations – this should not mean that 
the EU is delegating some of its R2P to the African continent.  
 
Africa has the potential to become a prime test-case of whether the EU will be willing 
to combine all three R2P elements under a single framework. The EU will be 
confronted with more R2P situations, where discussions of how to react cannot easily 
be fobbed off onto the UN or the AU to deal with. With an R2P strategy, the EU can 
emerge as a proactive international partner, and one that is better prepared to fulfil 
its Responsibility to Protect when the world is faced with another Rwanda. The 
Responsibility to Protect can restore the true meaning of ‘never again’. 
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ANNEX I 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
United Nations General Assembly, New York, 15 September 2005 (extract) 
 
 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity 
 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in 
accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage 
and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability. 
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the 
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, 
to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which 
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 
 
 
Source: United Nations, General Assembly Resolution, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 
A/RES/60/1, New York, 24 October 2005, p. 30. 
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ANNEX II 
African Peace and Security Architecture 
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Source: A. Vines & R. Middleton, “Options for the EU to Support the African Peace and 
Security Architecture”, European Parliament: Policy Department External Policies, Brussels, 
February 2008, p. 9.  
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